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Abstract: The goal of this investigation is to demonstrate the application of a 
process modelling approach to architect a System of Systems (SoS) capable of 
conducting Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) operations projecting to the year 
2025. Process modelling is a methodology for architectural analysis for 
complex systems whose operation is characterised by ‘processes’ whose 
sequential execution may be scaled-up to understand overall system behaviour. 
It is ideally suited to address complexity and interoperability issues of an ASW 
SoS. New contributions of this work include the successful implementation of a 
process modelling approach to architect an ASW SoS and a cohesive set of 
results analysing its operation with future projections to the year 2025.  
We believe this work may serve as a foundation for future systems engineering 
research addressing interoperability and performance of complex systems 
whose function is closely tied to time-dependent processes, with particular 
application to military and security systems. 
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1 Introduction 
A process may be defined as a sequence of operations and involved events that lead to 
the production of some outcome. The successful execution of a series of processes will 
comprise a fundamental part of the operation of almost any Systems-of-Systems (SoS).  
It has been observed (Osmundson et al., 2004) that 
“architectural analyses of complex systems-of-systems, therefore, often involve 
analyses of systems processes, with the goals of identifying the most important 
process design parameters that affect system performance and understanding 
the sensitivity of system performance to variations in the driving design 
parameters.” 
SoS that strongly rely on event or occurrence timelines particularly lend themselves to 
analysis based on paradigms of processes. Indeed, complex time-dependent systems with 
many subsystems are often best decomposed as a series of processes whose sequential 
execution may be scaled-up to understand overall system behaviour. Interactions 
between processes within a SoS may be mapped and optimised from a design perspective 
founded on this method. 
Process modelling is a methodology for architectural analysis based on this 
decomposition. Its use has been proposed for problems such as distributed information 
systems, logistics systems and manufacturing and distribution systems. It has been shown 
to be a particularly effective tool for analysis of complex systems with interoperability 
issues between a wide breadth of disparate system components (Osmundson et al., 2004). 
In this paper, we apply a process modelling approach to develop a SoS capable of 
conducting Anti-Submarine (undersea) Warfare (ASW) operations projecting to the year 
2025.  The driving motivation of our work is to identify areas of future research, define 
high-level requirements and critical capabilities.  While extensive research has been 
performed in ASW, no available work has addressed architectural issues on this level of 
abstraction. Our study is focused on an evolutionary approach through analysis of  
larger-scale functional issues, ideally guiding future efforts in lower-level design and 
system implementation. The principal aim was to elucidate synergies and trade-offs 
between broad component (asset), doctrinal and operational mechanisms in ASW 
systems, provide analysis and recommendation for future ASW architectures, and 
definitively recommend areas of future research and development for maximum impact 
to undersea warfare. 
Through a process modelling approach we designed, modelled and simulated a  
range of architectures to analyse overall system functionality and to determine the 
interoperability between land, space and undersea subsystems to analyse performance 
metrics for future ASW operations. 
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1.1 ASW complexity 
ASW is a unique problem, requiring the successful coordination of a huge amount of 
disparate assets in a very challenging operating environment. Critical issues contributing 
to the complexity of an ASW system include: 
• Functionality: ASW systems must perform a range of functions with many 
metrics for optimisation. 
• Constraints: ASW operating environments and purpose instil a large number  
of competing and tightly coupled constraints. 
• Connectivity: ASW subsystems are highly coupled and operation is strictly 
dependent on timelines. Connectivity and interoperability are very  
challenging to map and model in such a system. 
• Heterogeneity: ASW subsystems are heterogeneous and span many disciplines. 
Human interaction is critical. 
• System dynamics: ASW system behaviour, doctrine and performance metrics 
can significantly change over time. 
• Reducibility: while subsystems may be reduced, system behaviour is very 
challenging to decompose due to coupling. 
• Observability: many ASW system behaviours are not observable globally due to 
the nature of the system and its operating environment. Architectures must be 
decentralised to so as not to be sensitive to hidden states, yet, must still provide 
an assurance of global performance. 
Recent technological and political developments have resulted in a proliferation of tools 
and constraints for ASW activities. With respect to future ASW operation, Potter (1999) 
stated that: 
“The challenge is not in identifying useful technologies, but in bringing them to 
bear effectively on the tactical problems of naval combat scenarios. These 
technologies will make their mark when integrated (with): 1) Diverse platform 
types (surface and submarine vessels, remote operated vehicles (ROV’s), 
autonomous underwater vehicles (AUV’s), drones, aircraft and satellite) will be 
used in concert. 2) Diverse sensing technologies (multi-static passive and 
active, covert active, VHF active, laser) will be employed in a coordinated 
search over all useful ranges, bandwidths, resolutions and degrees of covertness 
required to span interests and needs, and 3) Systems will employ ‘smart’ 
processing and AI in the detection, classification and prediction of 
environmental developments.” 
These statements are backed up by Forecast International in their recognition of a trend 
of merging technologies such that limitations on weight, space and endurance constraints 
will no longer conflict, and any sensor can potentially be installed on any platform to 
provide on-time, accurate and faster processing for increased capability across a wide 
gamut of assets (The Market for Airborne ASW Sensors, 2004). 
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1.2 Methods of analysis 
We developed and implemented a process-based hybrid systems engineering analysis  
in this work, combining the approaches of Sage and Armstrong (2000) and Eisner 
(2002), with process modelling techniques inspired from Osmundson et al. (2004). 
Fundamentally, the ASW problem may be addressed within the context of the 
‘architectural views’ methodology described generally by Maier and Rechtin (2002), but 
more explicitly by Buede (2000). Buede specifically proposes an architectural model 
comprised of a functional architecture, physical architecture and an operational 
architecture. The functional architecture describes the purpose (‘functions’) of  
the system, the operating conditions under which it must execute these functions and 
how achievement of functional capabilities is met based on performance measures.  
The actual delineation of physical system elements, including technological components 
and system assets that must be synthesised into an integrated SoS is subsumed  
by the physical architecture. The mapping between the physical architecture and  
its resources to the system functions, in a manner suitable for quantitative  
analysis within simulation framework, falls within the construct of the operational 
architecture. 
The overall goal dictating the structure of our approach was to ensure that process 
modelling and analysis remained both iterative and comprehensive such that 
performance and interoperability were fully considered. The methodology was designed 
to dissect system processes and highlight the interactions within the system. In this 
approach, all processes must be repeatable for designing, developing and operating the 
system under study. This approach ensures that many alternatives will be considered, and 
that the proposed solution will be a refined system. 
1.3 Organisation of paper 
The following section describes the problem identification in detail, illustrates the major 
functions and decomposition of the ASW SoS with focus on the process timeline to be 
modelled, overall needs and functional flow. Section 3 details the architectures designed 
to address the needs and fulfil system objectives. Section 4 expands on the end-to-end 
process model developed to analyse each system architecture as it relates directly to 
executing desired functions of the system and to analyse the interoperability of all system 
components. Section 5 provides model simulation results and Section 6 makes 
recommendations for future ASW research and doctrine. 
2 Problem description, objectives and functional decomposition 
“Whosoever can hold the sea has command of everything.” 
Themistocles (524-460 BC) 
In recognition of the complexity, criticality and transforming role of undersea assets, 
the US Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Warfare Requirements and Programs 
directed the Wayne E. Meyer Institute of Systems Engineering at the Naval Postgraduate 
School to conduct a study of SoS architectures for the conduct of undersea warfare in the 
littorals projecting to the 2025 timeframe (Naval Postgraduate School, 2005).  
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The motivation for the research was the development of a full systems engineering 
analysis of potential littoral ASW addressing as broad a scope of systems as is feasible, 
starting with the current architectures of record as the baseline. 
2.1 ASW introduction 
While Director, ASW Division in the Office of the Chief of US Naval Operations, Vice 
Admiral John Morgan, USN (Morgan, 1998) summarised ASW complexity with the 
following ‘truths’: 
1 ASW is critically important to sea control, power projection and direct support 
to land campaigns 
2 ASW requires a complex mosaic of diverse capabilities … (demanding) a 
spectrum of undersea, surface, airborne and space-based systems 
3 ASW is hard … the near shore regional/littoral environment poses a very 
challenging ASW problem. 
The US Navy defines the primary goal of ASW as denying an adversarial force the 
‘effective’ use of their submarines (United States General Accounting Office, 1999). 
While the act of ‘denying’ can manifest itself in a range of diplomatic, military and 
political options, the focus of our system was to directly deter an enemy submarine from 
its mission and, if need be, neutralise it. 
A SoS accomplishing this goal will subsume a process driven timeline consisting of 
the specific actions of detecting, tracking, localising and neutralising (United  
States General Accounting Office, 1999) submarine threats. Existing architectural 
constructs seek to accomplish this through a mix of naval platforms including: aircraft, 
surface ships and friendly submarines. In the near future, a range of unmanned vehicles 
will also join this set of platforms. Individual platforms can be further broken down into 
their associated weapons and sensor systems. The coupled combination of platforms, 
weapons and sensors, as well as the operational tactics and doctrine that dictate their 
combat employment, are critical to the successful completion of any ASW mission. 
2.1.1 Limitations in existing architectures 
There exists a breadth of limitations in today’s ASW architectures, particularly given the 
lack of attention the topic has received (in the USA) in the last 15 years.  
Current architectures have been characterised as ‘inefficient’ because the process is 
“sequential, asset intensive and require[s] operational pause (sometimes lengthy) to 
prepare a limited area to support naval force operations with acceptable risk” (Benedict, 
2004). Many recent findings have corroborated this assessment, in particular with respect 
to the near-shore (littoral) region. 
We believe three main factors have demanded an evolutionary shift in ASW 
architectures: 
• Environment: legacy systems in place today have been designed for “nuclear 
submarines engagements in the open ocean environment” (United States 
General Accounting Office, 1999). Shifts towards littoral operations demand 
systems that account for near shore oceanographic phenomena. 
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• Technology: modern submarines have increased capabilities (advanced diesel 
and Air Independent Propulsion (AIP) power plants, etc.) that support quieter 
and more efficient operation over time. The presence of unmanned assets 
introduces a wealth of complexity/interoperability issues that traditional  
systems do not address. 
• Function: future missions and envisioned adversaries have changed the context 
of submarine operations. Holland (2005) summarised this transfer stating “while 
the number … is lower, the value of today’s individual targets is high, they are 
fewer and faster: much more difficult to find and hit”. Effective littoral ASW 
operations require sensors that can easily adapt to different operational 
environments and carry out their mission with a high probability of success 
(Naval Doctrine Command, 1998). 
2.1.1.1 Littoral region The littorals are characteristically ‘green or brown water’ – an 
often perplexing mix of acoustic multipath or limited range areas. Prediction of expected 
acoustic performance is difficult and even accurate predictions can be quite ephemeral 
due to numerous changing factors in the near-shore waters. While these acoustic 
conditions make sound-based ASW difficult to execute, they also make the planning 
nearly impossible to optimise.  As a brief generic example, suppose an area search 
requires sensors placed in a geometric pattern based on the expected detection range 
(which can be predicted based on water depth, temperature, salinity, wave action, 
shipping density and a number of other factors).  Further, suppose that there are 
considerable costs involved with the placement of the sensors – either the cost of the 
sensor or the cost of emplacement or perhaps both.  In a resource constrained world, 
efficient force deployment is called for and likely draws from a predetermined inventory 
that was predicated on expected requirements.  Now suppose the detection ranges can 
vary by a factor of 10 over the course of a single deployment or in the contemplation of 
deployment to different locales – what is the properly sized force for such uncertainty?  
Availability of assets quickly becomes a direct result of strategic budgetary decision 
making. 
The littoral environment is particularly challenging due to the ability of an adversary 
to conduct Anti-Access and Area-Denial campaigns from shore-based sites, while 
limiting exposure of their own naval forces. The conduct of such a campaign in the 
littorals will likely be conducted with submarines, mines and associated undersea  
force components that grant the ‘local’ submarine fleets distinct advantages, such as the 
ability to hide in background noise. 
2.1.2 Summary 
Current day systems restrict today’s ASW to platform-centric operations conducted as an 
enabling phase distinct from the main efforts to prevent unacceptable losses of singular 
high-value units. Also, multiplatform littoral ASW is largely based on experiences and 
knowledge gained through open-ocean ASW which are difficult to parallel today.  
As improved equipment and updated tactics, techniques and procedures are  
developed, the state of ASW must evolve from a sequential, platform-centric reality  
of today to the concurrent network-centric construct of the future (Chief of Naval  
Operations, 2005). 
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2.2 Needs and futures analysis 
2.2.1 Concept development 
Our team’s primitive problem statement was to “develop a SoS architecture for the 
conduct of undersea warfare in the littorals in the 2025 time-frame” (Naval Postgraduate 
School, 2005). The SoS is defined as alternate mixes of legacy and technology-driven 
future platforms and sensors that will leverage advances in order to provide with the 
most effective means available to prevent the enemy (‘red’) from successfully employing 
undersea assets against friendly (‘blue’) forces. 
2.2.2 Stakeholders 
Prior to any decomposition, we conducted an extensive stakeholder analysis for our 
system. A brief summary of the stakeholders identified were: 
• Decision maker: US CNO. 
• Clients: North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), US Combatant 
Commanders (COCOM), US Department of Homeland Security (DHS),  
US Naval Intelligence Community. 
• Sponsors: US Program Executive Office (PEO), US Type Commanders 
(TYCOM), US Department of Defence (DOD) US Department of 
Transportation (DOT), US DHS, US Congress, US Integrated Warfare  
Systems (IWS). 
• Operators: COCOM, NATO, Fleet Commanders [FLTCDR], Surface Warfare 
Officers [SWO], Submariners, MPA Personnel, Special Operations Forces 
[SOF], Explosive Ordnance Disposal [EOD], Sailors, Contractors (Defense 
Contractors), Fleet ASW Command. 
2.2.3 Effective needs statement 
Via careful analysis, system decomposition, input-output modelling and interviews with 
stakeholders, the effective needs statement for the system process was found to be: 
Design a future littoral undersea warfare system that denies enemy (‘red’) 
under water forces (submarines and UUVs) effective employment against 
friendly (‘blue’) forces within the littorals during the 2025 time frame. 
From this statement, system requirements can be generated through functional analysis. 
2.3 Functional analysis 
Based on needs and stakeholder analysis, a functional hierarchy, composed of top-level 
functions that had to be met in order for the system to perform, was developed. Top-level 
functions of the functional hierarchy for the ASW SoS challenge were Command 
(communicate), Deliver (deploy), Prosecute (search) and Defeat (Figure 1). The extent to 
which overall ASW mission objectives must be executed can be generally measured in 
terms of quantity, quality, area coverage, timeliness and readiness posture. All system 
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attributes, wants, needs and desires were characterised in terms of the degree of certainty 
in their estimate, the degree of criticality to system success and relationships to other 
requirements. 
A decomposition of each briefly follows. 
Figure 1 Top-level functional hierarchy 
 
2.3.1 Command decomposition 
The Command function is identified as the top-level function for the overall SoS 
functional hierarchy. The subfunctions for Command are: communicate the 
commander’s (CDR) intent, network ASW SoS tactical data and exchange Intelligence, 
Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) data. The supporting subfunctions for Command 
are architectural functions. Current command, control, communications, Computers, 
Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) system functions can be viewed 
from multiple perspectives. In order to design C4ISR architectures, the SoS needed to be 
addressed from an architectural framework perspective. For the purpose of this study, the 
C4ISR functions will consist of a communication architecture, an ASW tactical data 
network architecture and a separate ISR architecture. Figure 2 illustrates the Command 
functional hierarchy and supports the C4ISR SoS effective need. 
Figure 2 Command functional hierarchy 
 
2.3.2 Deployment decomposition 
Figure 3 shows the key functions the Deploy portion within the SoS, in order to 
accomplish the needs, wants and desires of the stakeholders. Subfunctions include: 
prepare – the ability to be equipped for rapid deployment via air, surface and subsurface 
assets external to the theatre of operations; deliver – the ability to interoperate with both 
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legacy and future deployment systems and sustain – the ability to provide the logistical 
support necessary to sustain those assets already within the area of operation (AO). 
Figure 3 Deploy functional hierarchy 
 
2.3.3 Prosecute decomposition 
The ASW Search environment can be broken down into three distinct tasks: identifying, 
developing and finally, combining the tasks. The task of identifying a threat in the ASW 
problem is just that – determining that the threat is an ASW threat. Once a problem area 
has been identified as a threat, the Navy will isolate the location, determine its identity 
and develop a fire control solution. All of this is done through the use of current ASW 
sensors and platforms. The Development Tasks help the user understand the functions  
of the respective sensors and assets in more depth, and how these assets interoperate with 
the environment, sound profiles and other elements found in the sound equation.  
The Combining Tasks portion puts the current sensors and their functions and 
performance factors together, and with some analysis, finds ways to improve detection 
and localisation. 
For the purposes of functional decomposition, the ‘Prosecution’ main function was 
partitioned into six distinct subfunctions of assess, search, detect, track, classify and 
identify. Figure 4 examines an initial amplification of each subfunction. For instance, 
under ‘track’, it is expected that this function encompasses maintaining a Contact of 
Interest (COI) history, developing a fire control solution, managing contacts for signature 
changes and developing criteria for anomalies. This reasoning was applied to all six 
subfunctions in the decomposition. 
Figure 4 Prosecute functional hierarchy 
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2.3.4 Defeat decomposition 
Figure 5 shows the overall functional hierarchy of the Defeat function. Subfunctions 
include: manoeuvre – the capacity to use energy storage and propulsion technologies to 
increase AOR coverage and time on station; deter – the capacity to present a show of 
force or presence to dissuade enemy opposition or movement and engage – the capacity 
to neutralise or disrupt the enemy’s ability to perform a desired mission. Deterrence and 
engagement were considered beyond the scope of this project. Additionally, the 
manoeuvre function and the objectives that followed were considered as a set of the 
functions of prosecution. 
Figure 5 Defeat functional hierarchy 
 
2.3.5 System functional flow 
In the process modelling approach to this problem, functions are discrete actions 
necessary to achieve the system’s objective. The branching and, most importantly, time 
sequencing of the SoS functional flow is critical to addressing the littoral USW problem. 
Should the branching and sequencing not be addressed, the SoS system will become rigid 
and unresponsive to the needs of the stakeholders. The functions of our system, for the 
littoral USW challenge, will ultimately be performed or accomplished through the use of 
equipment, personnel, sensors, logistical support, sustainability and adaptability 
throughout the life cycle of the system and are shown in Figure 6. It is important to note 
that the Command function of the SoS system remains constant throughout the SoS 
system functional flow. 
Figure 6 ASW system functional flow diagram 
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This operating concept describes our view of Littoral ASW in the 2025 time frame. 
Emphasis is placed on the full integration of deployed ASW platforms into a total ASW 
combat system with the ability to produce a ‘thinking field’ of fully networked combat, 
communication, sensor and weapons systems designed to strip the oceans away from our 
adversaries. We envision these thinking fields to be a SoS comprised of air, surface and 
subsurface platforms, both manned and unmanned, with the ability to rapidly surge from 
home bases, if not already on station as part of a forward-deployed strike group. The SoS 
will serve to deny the threat posed by enemy submarines within the world’s oceans, 
including the littoral waters. Specific to our analysis is the threat posed by  
next-generation AIP diesel submarines within the littorals, believed to be a major threat 
for the 2025 time frame. 
We define the ASW Search and Engagement mission to be comprised of five phases: 
Operational Planning, Search Planning, Search Execution, Search Evaluation and 
Contact Evaluation. The intent of this concept of operations is to accurately represent 
future ASW operations and standardise analysis efforts. Operations in the 2025 time 
frame will be centred on dominating the littorals by rapidly achieving area control 
despite difficult sound propagation profiles and dense surface traffic. The operating 
environment will be complex. It is assumed adversaries will be operating with significant 
advances in both stealth technology and weapon lethality (United States Navy, 2005). 
Therefore, it is essential that a system be developed that can avoid detection and be 
resistant to attack, as well as to penetrate and function in denied areas for sustained 
independent operations (Department of the Navy, 2004). Our team considered various 
SoS architectural alternatives that can achieve these broad objectives. 
2.3.6 System requirements 
Through extensive research and consultation with our stakeholder population, we 
determined a set of Littoral ASW requirements for the SoS detailed in Bindi et al. (2005). 
Requirements were broken down into each of the identified functional areas: Deploy, 
Prosecute, Defeat and Command. Broadly, our purpose was identified to design a SoS 
with the capacity to: 
1 begin ASW operations in the Operations Area (OA) within 72 hr of tasking, 
neutralise the threat within 10 days, and sustain that level of denial for 30 days 
to permit follow-on operations 
2 prosecute identified 2025 ASW threats 
3 reduce red threat platform performance 
4 transmit and receive communications, data and ISR information across a secure 
and survivable distributed control network. 
3 Architecture design and alternatives 
Our team developed four viable alternatives for conducting ASW in the littorals. Each of 
the alternatives is centred on a unique concept, as implied by their respective names. The 
alternatives can be described as follows: 
1 Tripwire 
2 Sea Tentacle 
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3 War of Machines 
4 Littoral Action Group (LAG) 
5 The four alternatives generated provide a common baseline for simulated 
operations. 
Two aspects important to the scenario are addressed in each alternative. The first is the 
concept of ‘harbour gate’. This concept is built into the alternatives with sensors acting 
as tripwires for submarines entering and leaving ports. The second issue is the concept of 
networked sensors and is also incorporated into each of the alternatives, providing for the 
ability to detect, track and classify any underwater enemy submarine or Unmanned 
Undersea Vehicle (UUV) present in the AOR. 
3.1 Assumptions 
3.1.1 Operational scenario 
In order to establish a method of comparing and evaluating current and future ASW force 
structure alternatives, our team developed a series of scenarios that scoped critical 
aspects of our proposed operating concept. Scenarios focused on capabilities in three 
functional areas: the ability to form a ‘Protected Passage’ of the Sea Lines of 
Communication (SLOCs) and to protect forces during transits, the maintenance of a 
‘Maritime Shield’ that would deny submarine access to operating areas and the ability to 
‘Hold at Risk’ enemy submarines throughout the maritime theatre (United States Navy, 
2003). Principal efforts focused on the most challenging of these scenarios – a ‘hold at 
risk’ mission conducted in defence of an island nation in a confined littoral environment. 
In the selected scenario, a red underwater force is preparing to conduct offensive 
operations within an island nation strait. The blue force is required to defend this island 
nation from threatening enemy undersea action and possible invasion. Blue forces will be 
supported by the deployment of several strike groups into the region to form a sea base, 
but before they can operate effectively within the region, the red submarine threat must 
be located and neutralised. The ASW SoS are detached then to the strait operational area 
in advance of the strike groups. It is assumed one red submarine is operating in the strait 
while two additional red submarines equipped with UUVs are preparing for offensive 
patrols. Denial of red underwater force operations is deemed critical. During the SoS 
transit, the two additional red submarines, previously reported in port, are located getting 
underway and may have deployed the strait. 
3.1.1.1 Specific locale We constructed a simple campaign scenario as a frame of 
reference to use as a baseline to judge competing system alternatives as they entered into 
the analysis of littoral ASW. A decision was made to focus on what many subject matter 
experts consider the most challenging littoral environment – the defence of an island 
nation in confined waters. This restriction led to the decision to model the environment 
of the Bass Strait separating Australia and Tasmania, which was chosen as a 
characteristic representation with oceanographic parameters that well-define littoral 
operations. Logistical deployment was also based on reaching this region. 
The basic campaign scenario calls for blue forces to rapidly respond to aggression 
against the relatively undefended Tasmania. Specifically for this study, blue forces must 
deploy into the Bass Strait to neutralise red submarines and their associated UUVs, 
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within three days of notification, and to facilitate follow-on operations designed to deter 
a complete invasion. This scenario is not intended to serve as a campaign analysis, test 
future operational plans or suggest any future threat. It was simply chosen based on the 
unique geography of the strait and the wealth of open access environmental data 
available. 
The various alternatives for the littoral ASW SoS were each evaluated in their 
conduct of the ASW search and execution mission with the task of neutralising the 
enemy underwater threat. Specifically, each alternative SoS was to be evaluated on their 
performance to begin ASW operations in the operating area within 72 hr of tasking, 
neutralise the threat within 10 days, and sustain that level of denial for 30 days to permit 
follow-on operations. 
3.1.2 Futures analysis and threats 
The littoral environment presents a myriad of threats to ASW operations. For example, 
(Naval Doctrine Command, 1998) stated 
“A submarine force composed of a few relatively unsophisticated submarines is 
capable of conducting coastal defense or sea denial missions. Such a force can 
attack merchant and logistics shipping, conduct covert offensive mining, 
support special operations forces, attack amphibious ships, and hold regional 
naval forces at risk.” 
Technology proliferation has broadened the capacity to field a credible submarine force. 
It is likely that over the next 20 years access to minisubmarines, improved submarines 
with extended underwater endurance and UUVs will grow significantly. We have 
identified four specific threat platforms for the purposes of this study: 
• Diesel-powered submarines: diesel-electric submarines are readily available and 
easy to acquire, creating a likely threat well into the 2025 time frame. This 
platform presents smaller space requirements than a nuclear submarine plant. 
Diesel propulsion submarines provide reduced chances of visual, heat or 
magnetic counterdetection. 
• Nuclear-powered submarines: nuclear-powered submarines possess increased 
range and on station time. This plant provides the most autonomy when 
patrolling for extended periods of time. Nuclear-powered submarines are 
susceptible to a high thermal-acoustic signature. 
• AIP submarines: advances in AIP and associated technologies for use on 
submarines continue to be made at a rapid pace. Producing no exhaust heat, AIP 
submarines will be difficult to detect, while fuel cells power undersea operation 
for weeks without surfacing. Power outputs of AIP technology are significantly 
less than diesel or nuclear submarines; AIP technology is most valuable in  
low-speed, long-range submersibles. 
• UUVs: UUV assets will assume a greater role in operations over the next few 
decades. These highly versatile vehicles are flexible for launch from a variety of 
platforms and are capable of operating in autonomous or controlled modes. 
Individually, the UUV is the least capable of submersibles due to limited range 
and the automation capabilities it must have, but resources allow for redundancy 
in deployment. 
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3.2 Alternatives generation 
Alternatives generation portion was completed in two distinct steps. The first step 
involved detailed research within each top-level system function to determine which 
entities were capable of accomplishing the ASW SoS associated subfunctions. 
Specifically, we identified future or existing systems and/or methods capable of 
performing required functions (command, deploy, prosecute, defeat) in our 
decomposition and objectives hierarchy to generate effective alternatives to the ASW 
littoral problem of 2025. 
In the second portion of the alternatives generation process, individual components 
from the generated function-specific lists were combined to create a series of SoS 
architectures capable of performing the defined ASW mission. Although thousands of 
architectures could result from the combinations, and numerous SoS were seriously 
considered, only four were finally determined to be distinct, feasible and useful for 
follow-on modelling and analysis. 
3.3 Alternative architectures 
3.3.1 Alternative 1: ‘Tripwire’ 
Summary: the tripwire alternative uses a combination of UUVs and Advanced  
Seaweb-based sensor components capable of assessing the oceanographic environment, 
while simultaneously searching, detecting and tracking red submarines throughout the 
AO. The Advanced Seaweb sensor components work in conjunction with the UUVs to 
create a complete underwater sensor network. 
The initial network will be focused around the 10 NM × 10 NM water space 
surrounding a red port facility. Any COI that is detected by an undersea sensor or a UUV 
during the prosecution phase will be communicated through the underwater network and 
to a Global Information Grid (GIG). The GIG will simultaneously hand off the 
information to a UUV for the purposes of tracking and classification. This underwater 
sensor network will generate a comprehensive picture of the AO. 
Assets: 50 Seaweb-based sensors and 5 UUVs are air-dropped per harbour. 
3.3.2 Alternative II: ‘Sea Tentacle’1 
Summary: the Sea Tentacle alternative combines all assets of the Trip Wire alternative 
plus a specially designed ship in complementary work by our sister team (Black et al., 
2006) accompanied by an MH-60 detachment in order to successfully conduct  
ASW in the littorals. Once assets are inserted into the AO, the effective utilisation of 
these assets will be paramount to achieving required sensor coverage. UUV assets will 
provide multiple capabilities while on station including operating submerged for 
extended periods collecting, receiving and transmitting data collected by its sensors. 
Assets: covering the AOR of a 100 NM × 200 NM box, Sea TENTACLE 
incorporates 3 Sea TENTACLE ships, 144 large vehicle UUVs, including 144 UUV 
sleds transported by the large vehicles that detach from the large vehicle to create a 
stationary bottom sensor, 864 light-weight UUVs that form the communications and 
‘brains’ of the sensors and 2304 man-portable UUVs deployed from the UUV sleds that 
spread out to form the sensor web. 
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3.3.3 Alternative III: ‘War of Machines’ 
Summary: in the War of Machines alternative, a combination of sensors, specific to each 
type of platform, will be utilised to develop a complete and detailed surface and 
subsurface picture of the AOR. This alternative deploys a series of UUVs and recharging 
stations designed to provide a real time tactical assessment in the AO. The combination 
of UUVs and their recharging stations allows for extended presence without personnel 
risks. This alternative provides for a robust and overlapping sensor suite capable of 
detecting any enemy submarine whether it is operating underwater or surfaced. 
Once a submarine has been detected, assets in this alternative will be capable of 
accurately tracking an enemy submarine while simultaneously coordinating with other 
unmanned platforms relaying detection and tracking information to ensure a constant 
track is maintained. Because of the extended tracking capability, this alternative will also 
be able to determine with a high level of confidence that the tracked contact is indeed an 
enemy submarine (higher classification confidence). 
Assets: at any given point in time, only 40 operational UUVs will be required to 
effectively cover the AO. If the UUVs are recovered and maintained, only 60 UUVs 
along with 12 recharging stations will be required to effectively cover the AO. If the 
UUVs are not recovered for maintenance, then 160 UUVs and 12 recharging stations will 
be required to cover the AO. 
3.3.4 Alternative IV: ‘LAG’ 
Summary: the LAG, when operating in the AO, will conduct coordinated littoral ASW 
operations with all available assets and sensors. These operations will be driven largely 
by the presence of submarines, both organic and inorganic to the LAG, and the 
endurance and capabilities of onboard unmanned assets to extend the reach of friendly 
forces as far inside the AO as possible while holding the enemy at risk. Assets in this 
alternative rely on high speed, manoeuvrability and low detectable signature to attack 
and withdraw in the shortest amount of time. 
Fundamentally, this alternative may be viewed as the closest to current ASW 
operations, with the addition of new surface platforms which are more aptly suited for 
the task in the littorals. 
Assets: LAG Composition: 2 SSN (on station), plus 1 DD(X) including organic assets 
and 3 LCS (ASW) including organic assets. 
4 Modelling and analysis 
A time-dependent process model subsuming the sequence of all system events was 
developed to analyse each architecture as it related directly to executing desired functions 
of the system and to analyse the interoperability of all system components within  
this context. To enable a systematic and comprehensive study on ASW architectures and 
the factors that affect their performance, this model was built and implemented in a 
simulation environment. Critical information on each phase of the process for each 
architecture was gathered and directly incorporated into the model. 
The goal of the simulation was to capture the functions, interfaces, delays and 
systemic characteristics to a desired level of fidelity. The resulting model emulates the 
processes involved in all phases of Figure 6. It provides a means for full accounting of 
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the transport vehicles, forces, equipment and supplies and their interactions within the 
system and allows studies of the dependencies of system architecture performance on 
design and noise factors. Given the breadth of processes involved in our ASW SoS, we 
used a combination of simulation packages with information transferred between them 
for each top-level system function. 
The specifics of the ASW scenario used for modelling, such as geographic location 
and number of enemy submarines, were determined by research by our team with 
extensive stakeholder input. Required model and data preparation followed directly  
from the team-generated scenario. Data to be used as model inputs included both friendly 
and hostile (Blue and Red) platform and system characteristics, abilities, vulnerabilities 
and tactics. A Red force structure was generated with associated doctrine, tactics, 
operations, schedule and vulnerabilities. This structure was held constant for all 
alternatives and replications. 
4.1 Command/information transfer 
Command was the only top-level system function that was not driven by the process 
timeline. Modelling for the littoral USW C4ISR system was divided between an  
Excel-based model for use in modelling undersea acoustic data transfer and an EXTEND 
(discrete event)-based model for modelling above sea data transfer. The two models were 
constructed in an effort to offer insight into system performance and provide direction 
for tactical and operational decision-making between various alternatives. Additionally, 
the two models offered insight into constraints on system performance and utility.  
The models support previous needs and objectives analysis by quantifying predicted 
performance that can be compared to the identified metrics and key requirements. 
Estimated sensor detection ranges, system power constraints and notional nodal  
spacing, focused model inputs to produce resultant model outputs. Specific models were 
created for undersea and atmospheric communications. Technical details of the undersea 
and atmospheric information transfer models used to support the SoS simulation  
(Bindi et al., 2005). 
4.1.1 Undersea information transfer 
Extensive modelling based on available data demonstrated environmental ambient noise 
to have the greatest effect on system performance. The model indicates that as frequency 
increases, transmission ranges decrease and as transmission power increases, 
transmission ranges increase. At an acceptable SNR of 100 dB, transmission ranges vary 
from 1200 to 2200 m depending on frequency and power at 42 dB of average AN. 
Additionally, when packet size is taken into account, broadband capacities at a 10 kHz 
carrier frequency and 8-bit digitiser constrain an undersea system by limiting the number 
of nodes that can make up one network. If 10 nodes were needed in a single network 
component, then the maximum data rate achievable would be 4000 bps on that 10 kHz 
carrier frequency. 
4.1.2 Atmospheric information transfer 
After completing a thorough sensitivity analysis on network performance, based on 
additional nodes, input and output common operating picture update message sizes, and 
the frequency update messages were sent, it was found that a relationship exists between 
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the number of participant nodes, node capacities and the update message sent frequency. 
Specifically, the frequency that update messages were sent has the greatest effect on 
network system performance. 
For a network system with more than 15 participants where limited capacity nodes 
such as the 0.5 MB-capacity node are present, update messages should be less than  
0.12 MB and sent at a frequency that allows for consistent processing to support COP 
update fusion times of less than 0.5 sec locally and 1 sec for final nodes in a relay. When 
COP update message sent frequency exceeds the ability of limited capacity nodes, 
participant nodes with receiving capacities less than 0.5 cannot be expected to perform 
critical, time-sensitive operations. The relationship between frequency and network 
participant numbers from this model that was found to optimise system performance was 
determined to be 4 to 1 for a 5-participant node system and 16 to 1 for a 17-participant 
node system. As a result of this finding, a determination was made for the message 
combination and the frequency update messages were sent. The determination made was 
that the central node fusion of update messages sent should occur at a rate of 1–N, N for 
the number of participants to 1 output COP update message. Additionally, COP update 
message size should increase as the update message sent frequency is reduced. 
With respect to bridging undersea and atmospheric battlespace networks, forming a 
radio frequency gateway between sea sensors and air data networks was represented in 
this model by the addition of a single, limited-capacity, transmitting node. Analysis of 
the node indicated that for the node to effectively operate, transmitted packets should be 
half the node’s capacity. For this model, extremely small amounts of data were 
contributed by the gateway node. Gateway node packets were set at 500 bits for a 
transmit capacity of 1.0 KB. Data latency due to transmitter capacity that was 
experienced did not have a significant effect on the overall system performance. Since 
gateway node update rates followed a triangular distribution between 10 and 20 sec, with 
a respective mean value of 15 sec, an excessive amount of backlog or node exhaustion 
did not occur. A 15-sec mean value gateway transmission time was proven by this model 
as a feasible capability that has a major impact on the reduction of the prosecution 
timeline. 
4.2 Deployment 
In an effort to provide a rapid response solution to ASW in the littorals in 2025, the use 
of subsurface and/or airborne delivery methods of UUV assets appear to be the most 
viable approach. However, an initial assumption considered for this problem will be the 
blue force’s military’s lack of air superiority in the AOR. This assumption places greater 
emphasis on the use of subsurface deployment vehicles and airborne delivery methods 
that can be deployed beyond the boundaries of the AOR. Additionally, if surface ships 
are to play a viable role in the littoral region, it will likely be from a distance outside the 
AOR unless their operation within the AOR maximises success, while maintaining a 
minimal risk to Blue forces. 
Research was collected on all potential deployment assets: surface, subsurface  
and air. Quantifiable characteristics such as speed, payload capacity, logistics 
requirements, logistics capabilities and sustainability were recorded and analysed for 
potential capabilities in each of the alternatives considered. Data regarding each 
individual asset, its logical point of origin, transit route and distance to the AOR were 
evaluated. Collective and exhaustive research was conducted on all assets necessary to 
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deliver SoS components to the AOR. Characteristic data, consisting of performance and 
design specifications, were utilised in conjunction with statistical data collected from 
historical performance and operations. This characteristic data was utilised when 
considering existing deployment assets. When researching programs of record for future 
systems, analogies between similar existing systems, as well as a review of material 
concerning these systems, predicted operating characteristics and test and evaluation data 
were utilised to develop data for implementation in the deployment model. These 
characteristics were entered into a process-driven deployment model to determine their 
viability within each alternative and for the overarching SoS. 
Modelling each of the four alternatives designed for the SoS required multiple 
simulation iteration to achieve stability within the data sets and provide an accurate 
representation of real world possibilities and constraints. Each alternative was subject to 
identical metrics allowing for uniform, in-depth analysis within and over each 
alternative. In order to implement the deployment model, several documented 
assumptions were made. These assumptions were made to reach the proper mix of time, 
space (distance) and force in deploying the SoS. The deployment model could not be 
adjusted for the factor of time. The inability to slow or speed up the factor of time forced 
diverse and wide-ranging force compositions originating from various distances.  
To evaluate the success of each alternative, each metric used the factor of time as its 
basis. Once each alternative was evaluated against the same set of metrics, analysis of 
advantages and disadvantages for each alternative was conducted. The alternatives were 
then compared to determine which alternative best met the challenge of undersea 
maritime dominance in the littorals in the 2025 time frame. 
All asset research data and assumptions were entered into the deployment model.  
For example, the input table (Table 1) was used to conduct sensitivity analysis of transit 
speeds, payload capacities and replenishment thresholds. Each of the possible 
deployment assets are listed on the far left column, while operating characteristics are 
listed across the top. Researched data was entered as hard numbers, while assumptions 
such as payload and replenishment thresholds were entered in yellow for continued 
sensitivity analysis. Similar inputs were tabulated for sensor (UUV) performance, 
reliability, tonnage and sustainment to assess the deployment process. 
Table 1 Red submarine underway time and mission 
Red platform U/W hour Mission 
AIP-A2 36 Proceed on track to OPAREA A and commence a random patrol 
AIP-C1 53 Proceed on track to OPAREA C and commence a random patrol 
AIP-B2 67 Proceed on track to OPAREA B and commence a random patrol 
AIP-A1 86 Proceed on track to OPAREA A and commence a random patrol 
AIP-C2 103 Proceed on track to OPAREA C and commence a random patrol 
AIP-B1 120 Proceed on track to OPAREA B and commence a random patrol 
AIP-U1 0 Commence random patrol throughout OPAREAs A, B or C 
AIP-U2 0 Commence random patrol throughout OPAREAs A, B or C 
Simulation of the deployment process was implemented in discrete increments, with any 
asset capable of reaching the AOR within the required time constraints considered for the 
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next phase of the deployment model. Those assets unable to meet the time requirements 
were discarded as viable options. The deployment model performed 115 iterations to 
produce a sample size that could be considered an approximate representation of a 
population. This process dictated the arrival time of assets for each alternative 
architecture. Tables of relevant assets follow as an Appendix. 
4.3 Prosecution and defeat 
Modelling of the prosecution phase followed the process timeline with the identified 
functions of assess, search, detect, classify and identify threats. Several means exist to 
search for, detect, track and classify enemy underwater forces. While the most common 
method is by intercepting and analysing underwater noise or sounds, other methods also 
include visual, radar, electromagnetic, infrared, laser and satellite imagery. If properly 
resourced, new technologies will exist in 2025 that will support friendly forces and 
provide the ability to quickly detect an underwater enemy asset in the required time. 
Shallow water, fixed-path, sound (acoustic) propagation is affected principally by 
three environmental factors: “tidal effects, water-column sound-speed fluctuations, and 
scattering from bathymetry and seabed” (Nielsen et al., 2002). Shallow-water sound 
profiles show that the sound waves refract downward causing ‘significant bottom 
interaction’ (Lepage, 2002). Turgut et al. (2002) ascertains that “active and passive sonar 
systems [are] strongly influenced by [the] interaction of acoustic energy and the seabed” 
and that proper knowledge of seabed properties (compressional wave speed, attenuation, 
density structure) is required in order for the sonar systems to perform their predictions 
accurately. 
Rigorous technical details of underwater acoustics is necessary to analyse the 
prosecution modelling effort, which is not the directed scope of this paper. Etter (1991), 
Nielsen et al. (2002), Lepage (2002), Turgut et al. (2002) and Ferla and Jenses (2002) 
provide a short summary of the background leading to models implemented; modelling 
details may be found in Bindi et al. (2005). For the purposes of analysis of the process 
model, a summary of the simulation tools used with the results presented here for each 
architecture. 
4.3.1 Prosecution/defeat model 
In order to gain the necessary insight and to fully analyse the interaction of the dynamic 
variables presented by the challenge of littoral ASW, our team utilised Naval Simulation 
System (NSS). This modelling programme was used specifically to consider interactions 
between platforms within our scenario. While command, control and logistics were 
inputs to the model, the metrics and interactions of prosecution were the focus of NSS 
modelling efforts. These efforts were, therefore, considered under the prosecution phase 
of operation, with defeat operations following subsequently. 
NSS is an object-oriented Monte Carlo modelling and simulation tool that has been 
developed, validated and verified by Space and Naval Warfare Command (SPAWAR) 
PD-15. The main goal of this model is to facilitate the analysis of four alternatives by 
comparing their performance within the given scenario. 
The vision of NSS is that of a set of validated low-to-medium resolution warfare 
entity models, certified data, appropriate simulation services and related user support 
tools in a framework suitable for modelling multiwarfare scenarios. NSS is less focused 
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on a prediction of an absolute outcome (as traditional discrete models) and more focused 
on promoting creativity through the visualisation of the battlespace, which allowed the 
assessment of a range of likely plans, tactics and outcomes, and in doing so, effectively 
evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of various alternatives. 
Representations of SEA-8’s proposed alternatives were constructed and tested in a 
simulated environment with no ‘man-in-the-loop’. All commander, platform and system 
entities were fully simulated. Analysis of these alternatives allowed for a detailed 
understanding of the capabilities, performance and interaction among forces within our 
scenario. The result was a better understanding of system interactions and quantitative 
assessment of forces with their associated ASW systems. 
All NSS platforms used in the scenario had specific attributes identifying alliance, 
asset type and operating medium (air, surface or subsurface). Specifically, all individual 
platforms are given unique motions or manoeuvring orders, a unique susceptibility to 
detection, platform specific sensors and system attributes and a unique command 
structure. Major modelling parameters included. 
Platform motion: all NSS platform-level objects have an initial motion plan that is 
valid for the duration of the scenario (one full replication). This motion plan is subject to 
change during the simulation, based on the simulated actions of the platform, mission 
area or on orders of the assigned warfare commander. Ships and submarines are assigned 
to be stationary, have a track/formation motion, conduct an area/barrier patrol or 
complete a complex motion, which is a combination of these. Additionally, a transit 
speed, search speed and tactical response speed is assigned to each platform.  
The Modelling Team utilised all such motions within the scenario and given alternatives. 
Track motion for surface and subsurface assets is conducted by assigning a track of 
specified waypoints to a specific platform. The platform will start the track on 
assignment and will maintain that track unless specified to do otherwise. 
Area patrol motion for surface and subsurface assets is conducted by assigning a 
region defined by user imputed data points that are connected to form the region.  
The platform can start at a specified or random point with the region and/or track to the 
region before commencing the patrol. Distributions for the time between successive 
course changes, leg speed and loiter times at the end of each patrol leg are specified or 
random depending on the scenario. For example, Red AIP submarine patrols were highly 
randomised, while Blue submarines had a more specified patrol motion. 
Barrier patrol motion for surface and subsurface assets starts at the beginning of the 
replication or when specified by the user. The platform transits back and forth unless 
vectored elsewhere. For example, a Blue submarine may perform a barrier patrol until a 
Red asset is detected. The Blue submarine will then commence tracking the enemy 
platform. If the track is lost, then the friendly asset will return and again commence a 
barrier search. 
Complex motion was the most widely used by the Modelling Team. This motion 
allows for the combination of various other motions. It employs a series of user defined 
track, area patrol and/or barrier patrol motion plans for an individual platform.  
The platform will operate as assigned unless vectored elsewhere to track a detected 
enemy platform, for example. If track is lost then the platform will resume the motion it 
was originally assigned. 
Susceptibility to detection: in NSS, the ability of a platform to be detected is 
modelled through the use of conceptual ‘detectable signature’ objects that are associated 
with each NSS platform. A detectable signature is specified in terms of its type, the 
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platform properties that can be determined when it is detected, the sensor types that can 
detect it and its schedule. For example, the Red AIP submarine is a subsurface asset with 
both active and passive sonar as well as radar that is activated according to a periscope 
schedule that is user selected. These acoustic and radar signatures indicate an enemy AIP 
submarine when detected by friendly assets. 
Commanders/direction: all NSS force assets are supported by numerous subsystem 
managers and one or more commanders. Subsystem managers are internal software 
constructs that provide an interface between the force asset (i.e. submarine or UUV) and 
its associated subsystem (i.e. passive sonar suite). There are three different types of 
commanders: Group Commanders, which may be assigned to a specific asset to control a 
group of assets; Warfare Mission Area (WMA) Commanders, which may be assigned to 
a specific asset and periodically request control of a Group Commander’s assets in order 
to perform a plan or tactic pertaining to a specific mission area (This would allow the 
WMA Commander to vector assets to track or utilise platforms’ sensors to their benefit. 
To alleviate competing demands for assets, a WMA prioritisation scheme is employed to 
determine which allocations are executed) and the Asset Commander, which simply 
interfaces with and controls all subsystem managers associated with a specific asset. 
Communications: we implemented ‘Assured Communications’ for NSS modelling. 
Under assured communications, messages and communications plans are represented 
explicitly by link terminals, communications nodes and networks. However, transmission 
delays are input by the user to provide time for processing transmissions and reaching 
posture requirements for transmission. 
Assured communications is hence generally applicable to operational situations or 
analysis in which communications connectivity and availability are not to be modelled in 
detail.2 Assured communications was selected for two reasons: firstly, this provided 
simplification to the model and allowed the team to focus on the ability of our system 
alternatives to detect and track. Secondly, a detailed, communication-specific model was 
developed by our team to study this aspect of the system and reached a level of 
abstraction that surpassed the capabilities of NSS. 
The way in which an Assured Communications Plan is used in an NSS simulation is 
as follows. Whenever a platform in either alliance (Red or Blue) determines the need to 
send a message, the following communications plan processing steps are triggered: 
1 if the message is a command/control message, it is sent to all intended recipients 
with simulated delays as specified by the user 
2 for contact and track reporting, the message is sent to all receivers associated 
with the send as specified in the connectivity plan, with a specified minimum 
and maximum transmit delay time declared by the user. 
Environmental representation: NSS explicitly represents bathymetric contours and the 
impact of bathymetry on ocean surface or subsurface platform motion and system level 
of performance. However, NSS does not explicitly represent other aspects of the ocean 
environment such as water temperature, thermoclines, etc. To account for this limitation 
of NSS, we utilised PC IMAT version 3.0 to calculate accurate propagation data that 
could be accounted for in NSS by altering a specific sensor’s ability to detect submarines 
at given ranges. A detailed explanation of how PC IMAT was used to generate NSS 
inputs can be found in Bindi et al. (2005). 
Metrics: NSS provides a comprehensive set of predefined metrics in the categories of 
state variables versus time, averaged event values versus time, event counts versus time 
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and event times. State variables versus time measures the instantaneous value of a 
specific state variable. An example would be the number of detections at a specific hour 
in the scenario. 
Event counts versus time counts monitors the number of occurrences of events of a 
specific type, such as detections, made for a given calculation time. Event times record 
the individual times of each occurrence of a specific type. 
For each metric type, we were able to specify the calculation times associated with 
each metric or we could specify the condition under which the metric instance was to be 
computed. The latter was most beneficial. For example, we were able to record the sum 
of all tracking times for all Blue forces or a single platform against enemy forces. 
Tracking metrics: the primary metrics utilised to fully analyse our four distinct 
alternatives are outlined below. 
Surveillance detections: for the detectable asset (Red AIP submarines), this metric 
counts the number of detection events simulated to occur during the time interval in 
question. For tracking sensors, detection events include start/end track and track update 
events. For non-tracking sensors, detection events are equivalent to sensor detection 
events. 
Tracking sensor events: for the detectable asset, this metric counts the number of 
track events simulated to occur during the time interval in question. 
Tracking sensor status change time: for the detectable asset, this metric records the 
times of initial detection, time(s) of track updates and loss of track for each track held by 
the tracking sensor. 
Total tracking time: for the detectable asset, this metric records the total time a given 
track is held by any tracking sensor in each time interval in question. For multiple tracks 
held simultaneously, the time recorded is the total length of time, there is a track held by 
any of the selected tracking sensors. The maximum possible time that can be returned by 
this metric is the length of the interval. 
4.3.1.1 NSS simulation plan development  The specifics of the ASW scenario used for 
modelling, (geographic location, number of enemy submarines, etc.) were determined. 
Required model and data preparation followed directly from the team-generated scenario. 
Data to be used as model inputs included both friendly and hostile (Blue and Red) 
platform and system characteristics, abilities, vulnerabilities and tactics. This information 
was provided as a result of the research done by our team with input from stakeholders. 
In addition to our alternative architectures, we constructed a Red force structure with 
associated doctrine, tactics, operations, schedule and vulnerabilities. This structure was 
held constant for all alternatives and replications. 
The makeup of the Red alliance consisted of two AIP submarines moored in each of 
three harbours. Additionally, there were two AIP submarines underway within the Red 
operational area. Each scenario starts with the Red assets in place as described. 
When the simulation was commenced, all moored submarines get underway at a 
specified time and proceed with a 5-knot transit speed until they reach their designated 
OPAREA. Red submarines from Harbour A were tasked to patrol in OPAREA A, while 
Red submarines from Harbour B patrolled in OPAREA B and so on. Patrols were 
conducted with random motion at a speed of 5 knots. The two Red submarines already 
underway started with a 6-knot, random-motion patrol and maintained this for the 
duration of the 30-day scenario. Table 1 indicates when each specific Red asset got 
underway and proceeded with its assigned mission. Details of the operational areas can 
be seen in the Figure 7. 
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Figure 7 Bass Strait and Red OPAREAs A, B and C 
 
All Red submarines were vulnerable to passive acoustic sensors, active acoustic sensors 
and to radar detection when at periscope or snorkel depth. These vulnerabilities were 
directly linked to a unique signature that will identify them as hostile to Blue forces and a 
track was initiated. 
5 Simulation results 
5.1 Deployment 
Once all data was recorded and analysed separately for deployment in each individual 
alternative, the Cumulative Density Function (CDF) for each was then captured, 
compared and contrasted. A 90% confidence level was constructed about the mean to 
illustrate variability within each alternative as compared to the other alternatives.  
Figure 8 depicts the mean CDF for the percentage of critical assets for each alternative 
deployed versus time. The figure also includes an upper confidence bound, and a lower 
confidence bound for each alternative. 
Figure 8 shows the distinct data output of each alternative when considering  
their deployment. The greater the area between the closest confidence bound of  
a competing alternative, the greater the military significance difference between them 
could be. When an overlap occurs, this may indicate potentially little difference in 
competing deployment alternatives. The data collected from this model provided a basis 
for all asset deployment timelines for performance simulation in NSS. 
5.2 Prosecution and defeat 
5.2.1 Search and detection 
With inputs from other model process phases, NSS modelling outputs were imported into 
an Excel spreadsheet for analysis and graphed to provide a quick glance at the overall 
results for prosecution and defeat and thus the entire SoS. Three key issues were 
analysed by exploring the data extracted from the NSS simulations. First was the 
Probability of detection (Pd) of all Red submarines by Blue assets per time step. This 
provided a view of how long it would take the assets in that scenario to reach a Pd of 
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80% (defined based on stakeholder feedback). The second data point extracted looked at 
the Pd of any Red submarine by Blue assets per time step. In this instance, each 
scenario’s data showed at what time step Blue assets reached the Pd goal for any Red 
submarine. The third and final point of analysis was taking a look at an instantaneous  
Pd of Red submarines by Blue assets per time step. This data was more comprehensive 
and utilised 100 simulation runs in each of the scenarios as opposed to just looking at 
first detections. All of the three data points analysed are shown in their respective graphs 
in Figures 8–11. 
Figure 8 Alternative confidence intervals 
 
Figure 9  Pd of all Red submarines by Blue assets per time step for each alternative 
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Figure 10 Pd of any Red submarines by Blue assets per time step for each alternative 
 
Figure 11 Instantaneous Pd for any Red submarine by Blue assets per time step showing  
initial Pd as assets enter theatre and the SS Pd with permanence of assets  
in theatre 
 
The Pd of all eight enemy submarines by each specific scenario hour is shown in  
Figure 9. The War of Machines alternative provided the best performance, with a Pd of 
0.80 by 7 days 1 hr. This means that by 7 days 1 hr, the War of Machines alternative had 
achieved an 80% probability of detecting all eight Red submarines. 
Following the War of Machines alternative was the TSSE alternative, achieving a Pd 
of 0.80 in 12 days. Third in performance was the LAG alternative at 15 days 11 hr and 
finally, the Tripwire alternative at 17 days, 8 hr. It is also important to note that the 
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Tripwire alternative never reached 100% probability of detecting all the eight Red 
submarines in the 30-day scenario. Figure 10 shows the probability of detecting any one 
of the eight enemy submarines by the scenario hour listed on the x-axis. 
Individual alternative Pd of 0.80 for any Red submarine versus Pd of 0.80 for all 
eight Red submarines is summarised in Table 2. 
Table 2 Comparison chart of Pd = 0.80 for any and all Red submarines detected by 
Blue assets 
Alternative Pd = 0.80 for ANY one of 8 Red Subs Pd = 0.80 for ALL 8 Red Subs 
Tripwire 4 days 20 hr 17 days 8 hr 
Sea TENTACLE 11 days 2 hr 12 days 0 hr 
War of Machines 4 days 21 hr 7 days 1 hr 
LAG 10 days 7 hr 15 days 11 hr 
Of interest was alternative 2, which detected the first Red asset at 11 days 2 hr, and, 
within the next 22 hr, was able to detect the remaining seven Red submarines. 
Figure 11 shows the likelihood of detecting a submarine at any time. All four 
alternatives are shown in order to compare the probabilities of detection during the initial 
phases of the scenario and the Steady State (SS) Pd achieved after the sensors are in 
place and operating continuously. 
The Tripwire alternative shows a steadily increasing Pd from 0 to 116 hr and then 
drops off to near 0. The increased Pd was as a result of Red submarines leaving port at 
specified intervals and passing through a Seaweb-Based Sensor (SWBS) (grid 
established at the entrance to these ports. The SWBS system, in conjunction with  
15 UUVs, achieved a maximum Pd of 0.4375 at 107 hr. By 116 hr, the SS Pd drops 
down to 0.013. This is due to the 80 hr battery life limitation of the UUVs. The value of 
Pd does not drop completely to 0 because the SWBSs are still capable of detecting Red 
assets, but they are not strong enough to be considered militarily significant. 
In the Sea Tentacle alternative, platforms began arriving in theatre at 187 hr with a 
gradual buildup of sensors throughout the AOR, thus populating the AOR with sensors 
over time. This led to the stair-stepping Pd witnessed in Figure 11. A SS Pd was finally 
achieved at hour 309 once all of the sensors were in place and operational. In this 
alternative, the maximum Pd was 0.4375 with a SS Pd of 0.3569 (27 times improvement 
over Tripwire alternative). 
The War of Machines Alternative consisted of UUVs deployed over time, with 
recharging stations to ensure that operations remain continuous throughout the scenario. 
This alternative also demonstrated a gradual increase in Pd that began at scenario hour 0, 
and continued until all sensors have been deployed, including the recharging stations. 
The Pd achieves a high of 0.2263 at 123 hr, but drops to 0.1025 at 156 hr (see curve in 
Figure 11 dip down) due to the UUVs starting to recharge, during which time they are 
non-operational. The SS Pd was achieved at 0.26, and the maximum Pd for this 
alternative reaches 0.3263, slightly lower than the TSSE Alternative. 
The final alternative, LAG, was based on the conventional approach to ASW. This 
alternative was slow to start because of the time required for assets to arrive on station.  
In this alternative, assets arrived on station and began detecting Red submarines by  
142 hr (5 days 22 hr). The Pd gradually increased until a SS Pd of 0.057 was reached 
throughout the scenario. 
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Data represented in Figure 11 is different than the Pd represented in Figure 11.  
Figure 11 represents a cumulative Pd over each time step and was based on first or initial 
detections of each iteration of the scenario (100 total iterations), whereas Figure 11 data 
represents each alternative’s instantaneous ability to detect a submarine at that given time 
step and was based on the average number of detections for each time step over all 
iterations in the scenario. In other words, as Blue assets enter the theatre of operations, 
the Pd was determined not only by their sensor range, but also by their permanence in the 
AOR. 
Table 3 summarises the maximum Pd shown in Figure 11 and explained in the 
paragraphs following the graph. 
Table 3 Summary of Pd for each alternative with the Start Hour, Maximum Pd and SS Pd 
Alternative Pd start hour Maximum Pd Steady state Pd 
Tripwire 107 0.4375 0.0130 
Sea TENTACLE 187 0.4375 0.3569 
War of Machines 17 0.3263 0.2600 
LAG 142 0.0800 0.0570 
If considering Pd as a key metric in determining best alternative, the TSSE and War of 
Machines alternatives provide the best Pd among all four alternatives, as shown in  
Table 3. 
Table 4 is a spreadsheet of ‘best combinations’ that can be used to generate a higher 
Pd. This spreadsheet was created by using the same sensor combination simplistic model 
as used previously in this section where the P(not d) of each of the alternatives being 
combined were multiplied together in order to arrive at a P(not d)total and then subtracting 
this value from 1 to get a Pd of the combination of methods. The data shows that if the 
maximum achieved Pd was utilised, the best choice is a combination of alternatives 1 and 
2 or a combination of all three alternatives together, with alternatives 1, 2 and 3 or 
alternatives 1, 2 and 4 combined to give a Pd greater than 0.70. 
Table 4 Pd of Combined Alternatives using Max Pd and SS Pd to determine the ideal 
combination of alternatives that provides a higher Pd 
Pd Achieved by combining alternatives 
Alternative Max Pd SS Pd 
Tripwire and TSSE 0.6836 0.3653 
Tripwire and War of Machines 0.6210 0.2696 
Tripwire and LAG 0.4825 0.0693 
Sea TENTACLE and War of Machines 0.6210 0.5241 
Sea TENTACLE and LAG 0.4825 0.3936 
War of Machines and LAG 0.3802 0.3022 
Tripwire, Sea TENTACLE and War of Machines 0.7868 0.5303 
Tripwire, Sea TENTACLE and LAG 0.7089 0.4014 
Tripwire, War of Machines and LAG 0.6514 0.3113 
Sea TENTACLE, War of Machines and LAG 0.6514 0.5512 
Tripwire, Sea TENTACLE, War of Machines and LAG 0.8039 0.5571 
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Utilising a combination of all four alternatives, the instantaneous Pd was to meet the 
assigned goal of 0.80. However, the SS Pd produced lower expected Pd values.  
The combination of alternatives that provided those higher probabilities shows a Pd 
slightly above 0.50. Using this as a low-end, the conclusion was that a combination of 
alternatives provided a Pd between 0.50 and 0.80. However, an instantaneous probability 
of 0.06 (obtained by combining SS or instantaneous Pd for Tripwire and LAG) may be 
enough to provide a Pd of 0.80 over a specific amount of time steps, a metric not defined 
within this goal. 
5.2.2 Tracking 
The data used to analyse each alternative’s ability to track was extracted from NSS and 
evaluated, from which we could then draw conclusions. The metric analysed was the 
probability that a Blue asset could track a Red submarine long enough to contribute to 
one or more of the following actions: 
• handoff the information to a weapon platform 
• generate a fire control solution 
• classify the Red submarine 
• launch a weapon 
• force the Red submarine to leave the OA 
• defeat Red submarine. 
The amount of time required for tracking, therefore, was dependent on the operational 
requirements. This time could potentially range from a few seconds to hours or even 
days. This research investigated the metric of evaluating the probability that a Blue asset 
can track a Red submarine in 6-min intervals from 6 to 54 min. In the case of tracking, 
this was simply a confidence level of how probable it was that the assets involved in each 
alternative will track for the amount of time needed. Tripwire was the first alternative 
examined and is shown in Figure 11. 
This scenario does not provide a good overview of Blue’s tracking ability, it shows a 
very low confidence level. Figure 12 shows the Tripwire alternative’s sensors’ ability to 
track all eight Red submarines. Sensors in the Tripwire alternative were designed to 
detect a Red submarine when it leaves the port. After a Red submarine leaves port, the 
alternative depends on SWBs and a limited number of UUVs to continue tracking Red 
submarines. The results shown in Figure 11 indicate this alternative lacks the ability to 
track with the Sea-web sensors and the UUVs, which have tracking capabilities, have 
only an 80-hr endurance. If the expected confidence level for this alternative was to 
provide the operational commander with a 90% confidence level that the sensors will 
have the ability to track all Red submarines for any period of time, this alternative has 
clearly failed. 
Figure 13, however, represents Tripwire’s ability to track any one of Red’s eight 
submarines for each designated period of time. 
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Figure 12 Probability that Blue assets can successfully track Red submarines per time  
step in 6-min intervals for alternative 1 – tripwire 
 
Figure 13 Probability that Blue assets can successfully track any one Red submarine per time 
step in 6-min intervals for alternative 1 – tripwire 
 
While this data looks more promising than that which is shown in Figure 12, a 90% 
confidence level was only achieved in the six minute tracking time and only after  
598 time steps (24 days 22 hr). 
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The second alternative examined was TSSE. This scenario shows a significant 
improvement in the tracking ability over the Tripwire alternative. Figure 14 shows the 
probability that the sensors in the Sea Tentacle alternative can track all eight Red 
submarines. After time step 240, the 6-min tracking ability shows an almost vertical 
probability of tracking capability, with the slope of subsequent time intervals gradually 
decreasing. As Figure 14 shows, 100% confidence in Blue asset’s tracking capability was 
eventually achieved by all of the time requirements, with the exception of the 54-min 
tracking requirement. 
Figure 14 Probability that Blue assets can successfully track Red submarines per time  
step in 6-min intervals for alternative 2 – TSSE 
 
While this alternative does not fail in the same sense that the Tripwire alternative fails to 
provide a high tracking confidence level, the fact that it takes almost 250 time steps to 
achieve tracking may have a negative impact on operational commitments. 
Figure 15 shows the probability that Blue assets can successfully track any one Red 
submarine per time step for each of the 6-min intervals. Unlike the results shown in 
Figure 14, when just one Red submarine was tracked, the sensors in this alternative start 
showing the ability to track at time step 190. By time step 250, the 6-min tracking 
requirement shows a 70% probability, which may be a high enough confidence for an 
operational commander. 
The third alternative was War of Machines. This alternative produced results that 
show a significant improvement in Blue’s ability to successfully track any (Figure 16) or 
all (Figure 17) Red submarines over each of the previous two alternatives. In Figure 11, 
the ability of Blue assets to track Red submarines over the required time period was 
almost identical for each of the nine time intervals evaluated. A confidence level greater 
than 90% was achieved within 100 time steps of the first indications that Blue can track 
all of Red continuously for each time interval studied. 
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Figure 15 Probability that Blue assets can successfully track any one Red submarine  
per time step in 6-min intervals for alternative 2 – TSSE 
 
Figure 16 Probability that Blue assets can successfully track Red submarines per time  
step in 6-min intervals for alternative 3 – War of Machines 
 
While the TSSE alternative showed that the tracking probability starts to increase at time 
step 250, this alternative demonstrated that, by time step 250, all of the evaluated time 
intervals reach a 100% confidence level in Blue’s tracking ability. 
Figure 17 shows that Blue assets have a constantly increasing ability to track any one 
Red submarine. In addition, the probabilities of Blue successfully tracking Red for each 
time interval studied are almost identical. By time step 160, the confidence level reaches 
90% on all nine time intervals. At a quick glance, the conclusion could be made that if 
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the time to achieve the required confidence level was in line with the time steps 
represented by this scenario, this alternative succeeds in providing that required tracking 
capability. 
Figure 17 Probability that Blue assets can successfully track any one Red submarines per  
time step in 6-min intervals for alternative 3 – War of Machines 
 
The LAG alternative tracking capability confidence levels are represented in  
Figures 18 and 19. Figure 18 shows Blue assets’ ability to track all of Red’s submarines 
over the time steps and in the tracking time intervals needed for the kill chain to take 
place. This alternative was probably the second weakest alternative in that it never 
reaches a 100% confidence in Blue’s tracking ability for all eight enemy submarines. The 
increase in confidence level was gradual and takes dozens of time steps for small 
improvements in performance. 
Figure 18 Probability that Blue assets can successfully track Red submarines per time  
step in 6-min intervals for alternative 4 – LAG 
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Figure 19 Probability that Blue assets can successfully track any one Red submarine  
per time step in 6-min intervals for alternative 4 – LAG 
 
Figure 19 shows the probability that Blue can track any one of Red’s submarines at each 
of the time intervals. As the graph shows, the increase in probability was sharp at first, 
but as time progresses, the confidence levels take longer time to reach, with only the  
6-min tracking time reaching 100% in the scenario. 
General conclusions can be drawn from all of the data analysed above. The best way 
to evaluate which alternative succeeds over other alternatives was to take a look at which 
alternative impacts the kill chain more than the others. 
By taking a snapshot of a specific time step, and by putting all of those data points  
on the same graph, one can see which alternative provided the strongest and weakest  
link in the kill chain. Figure 20 shows that specific snapshot at time step  
240 (10 days into the scenario) for Blue’s ability to track all eight Red submarines for the 
time intervals that were evaluated in the graphs above. As the graph clearly shows, the 
War of Machines alternative has the ability to track all eight Red submarines for  
any of the nine time intervals evaluated. Although the confidence level slowly  
decreases, the change does not exceed 10%. In the other three alternatives, the tracking 
confidence level remains slightly below 10% and quickly drops to 0 as the time  
interval increases. 
Figure 21 shows Blue’s ability to track any of Red’s eight submarines. The War of 
Machines alternative shows an unhindered ability to track in either of the nine time 
intervals with a slight, but insignificant, decrease in the confidence level. The second best 
alternative is Tripwire, which plateaus at 75% confidence by the 24-min time interval. 
LAG and TSSE alternatives both show a gradually decreasing ability to continuously 
track a Red submarine at greater time intervals. The lowest confidence is 10% at the  
54-min interval for TSSE and 25% confidence at the same time interval for the LAG 
alternative. 
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Figure 20 Snapshot of the probability of Blue assets being able to track all Red  
submarines by 240 time steps 
 
Figure 21 Snapshot of the probability of Blue assets being able to track any one of  
Red’s 8 submarines by 240 time steps 
 
6 Conclusions 
6.1 ASW analysis and conclusions 
This work has generated insights into the future of littoral ASW during the problem 
definition, modelling and analysis phases of the systems engineering design.  
By comparing distinct alternative architectures, we have been able to identify which 
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aspects of each alternative are critical to its success as well as to quantify the value of 
each solution’s strength and weakness. From our analysis, we have drawn the following 
conclusions: 
There are no perfect systems: no single alternative was the best solution for all ASW 
scenarios. Theatre specific variables such as threat, geography, remoteness of location, 
ambiguous warning periods, Red-force timelines and differing Blue-force readiness 
profiles prevented the determination of a single dominant solution. While each 
competing alternative ASW force structure had strengths, each also had weaknesses. 
Some alternatives were logistically burdensome, others could not respond quickly when 
warning timelines were short, and those that could be rapidly deployed tended to lack 
pervasive endurance. Pronounced differences in detection and tracking capabilities exist 
between alternatives, but even the worst performer could be effective if the Blue timeline 
was flexible. The best solution may be a combination of system architectures that could 
be tailored to suit specific theatre scenario needs. 
Reaction time is the key driver to seizing the initiative: our process modelling 
demonstrated that red submarines was most vulnerable entering and exiting their home 
ports, due primarily to restricted waterways, where position and movements were 
predictable. Therefore, detecting and tracking these submarines as they were leaving port 
became an important part of the research study. However, red force actions were 
uncertain and (without any future intelligence-gathering advantage) attempting to 
determine when and from where they were to deploy their submarines was difficult. 
Warning timelines were often ambiguous and unpredictable. During modelling and 
simulation, blue forces were unable to begin ASW operations within three days or to 
seize the initiative within 10 days without leveraging the delivery, flexibility and speed 
associated strategic air assets got non-traditional ASW assets such as UUVs and netted 
sensor grids. 
Persistent systems are required to sustain ASW denial: constant presence of detection 
systems was required to effectively sustain ASW for 30 days. Ability to achieve undersea 
control was dependent on employing systems that were persistent in both time and space. 
Traditional methods used relatively small numbers of sensing platforms over large areas. 
These assets were persistent in time, but due to their limited number were not persistent 
in space. Non-traditional methods (such as rapidly deployed sensor grids and UUVs) 
proved to be persistent in space, but without improvements in system recharging, tending 
and/or replacement they lacked the staying power of more traditional manned assets. 
Defeat timeline trade-offs exist between traditional and non-traditional ASW 
methods: traditional manned trailing assets require short defeat timelines because of the 
need for manned systems to operate from a safe trailing distance in order to prevent 
counterdetection and countertargeting. While maintaining safe standoff, a quieter red 
force will further complicate the problem for manned platforms. Traditional ASW forces, 
using traditional ASW methods, have to make rapid choices concerning whether or not to 
engage or else risk losing contact with a perspective target. By comparison, invasive  
non-traditional unmanned trailing systems that are capable of tracking at a closer range, 
decreased their probability of lost track and allowed for the use of longer timeline attack 
systems. 
Undersea Joint Engagement Zones (UJEZ) are the key to unlocking the power of 
future ASW technology: finding that no single ASW alternative was the best solution for 
our littoral ASW scenario, and after gaining insight on the preceding themes of Reaction 
Time, Presence and Kill-Chain Timeline (KCT) tradeoffs, we have concluded that a 
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dramatic shift in ASW doctrine and methodology was required to unleash the power of 
future ASW technologies. The waterspace management and Prevention of Mutual 
Interference (PMI) techniques employed during the late 20th century are akin to  
stove-pipe engineering; they prevent complementary platforms and sensors from 
operating together to fill other systems’ weaknesses in deployment timelines, endurance, 
prosecution and engagement capabilities. This study shows that future littoral ASW 
requires a scenario-specific mix of sensors, UUVs and manned platforms that will 
operate with one another in the same waterspace. It is imperative that these forces be 
designed to operate cooperatively, with low false positive and fratricide rates, in a 
manner that more accurately resembles the Joint Engagement Zone (JEZ) currently used 
by air warfare systems. 
6.2 Contributions 
The goal of this work was to demonstrate the application of a process modelling 
approach to develop and analyse a SoS capable of conducting ASW operations 
projecting to the year 2025, with specific focus on system performance and 
interoperability. ASW is a unique problem with a level of complexity beyond 
conventional analysis techniques. Despite wide recognition of this issue, no available 
work today has addressed high-level architectural issues of ASW operations on this level 
of abstraction. New contributions in this paper include: 
• the successful development of a process modelling approach to map operations 
for an ASW SoS 
• the successful simulation of a large-scale high-level set of processes using a 
range of platform characteristics, data and constraint parameters 
• the integration of numerous high-fidelity models representing a very diverse 
range of events, phenomenon and platforms into one cohesive system whose 
overall performance could be assessed 
• the successful simulation of the interaction of these models (whose fidelity 
precluded combination in any single software system) to provide an 
understanding of the interoperability of the overall system 
• the first cohesive set of results analysing the overall operation of an ASW SoS 
as a series of processes with future projections to the year 2025. 
We believe this work may serve as a foundation for future systems engineering research 
addressing the interoperability and performance of complex systems of systems whose 
function is closely tied to time-dependent processes with particular application for 
military and security systems. 
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Appendix  
Relevant platform and sensor assets modelled for deployment  
and prosecution 
Figure A1 Modelling input data for potential asset deployment 
 
Figure A2 Payload data for modelling input sensor asset deployment 
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Figure A3 Sensor hierarchy breakdown and all-inclusive list of sensor systems 
 
 
 
